McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2012.
496 pp., illus., $49.95 hardcover
Over the past decade or so there has been a remarkable increase in studies on the Canadian Forces in war and peace. Nicholas Tracy provides a major contribution in arguably one of the most thorough political examinations of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) from its birth to the present day. Tracy’s single volume is a must–read for scholars, policy–makers, and the public interested in not just the historical, political, organizational, and bureaucratic forces that have dictated the structure and operational employment of the RCN but also the RCN’s role in Canadian defence and foreign policy writ large.
Tracy’s employment of the “two–edged sword” metaphor, which he labels a paradox, concerns commitments to collective defence as “a means to avoid national subordination.” While one can contest whether the metaphor truly represents a paradox, rather than a conundrum or simple irony that all small states confront to varying degrees in dealing with great powers, it provides the link to a much broader understanding of Canadian defence thinking and practice. In the case of North America, it is found, for example, in the commitment to the bi–national NORAD aerospace command as a means to ensure and enhance Canadian sovereignty.
In effect, Tracy is implicitly addressing Canada’s grand strategy. Whether as collective or bi–national defence, at home or overseas, Tracy speaks to Canada’s commitments to its imperial patron — initially Great Britain, and, since World War II, the United States — as a means to advance Canadian national interests and independence. At the same time, Tracy also values RCN commitments in the context of a policy of counterweights, which he terms “a make–weight” to offset the dominance of the United States, even to the point of suggesting a revitalization of the long–dead Commonwealth connection.
The relative significance to be placed on grand strategy versus counterweights in understanding the RCN as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy is left to the reader to decide. As regards influencing U.S. policy, once again it is open for the reader to decide whether such influence comes primarily from highly valued Canadian naval capabilities or simply from the willingness of governments to commit naval forces to U.S.–led “coalitions of the willing.”
Nonetheless, Tracy does leave the impression that valued capabilities are the key to influence; and, if this is the case, then the aforementioned counterweight can be interpreted largely as rhetoric for domestic consumption. This is further reinforced in the importance he gives to senior RCN decision–makers and to a significant degree of government neglect to the details of defence.
Tracy’s study spends little time examining the economic dimension of maintaining politically and militarily functional RCN capabilities relative to the rising costs of vessels and the demands of ensuring interoperability with the United States navy. This dimension, of course, raises a range of key issues, including the demands of each of the services in environments of shrinking and rising budgets, relative to the relationship between highly valued capabilities and the United States.
Nonetheless, Tracy’s study not only provides a valuable narrative of the history of the RCN but also opens the door to much deeper questions about the role of the Canadian Forces in supporting and advancing Canadian national interests. Above all else, he demonstrates the clear linkage between foreign policy and military capabilities and commitments — a linkage of which policy-makers in Ottawa, the media, and the public at large need constantly to be reminded.
— James Fergusson (Read bio)
James Fergusson is the director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba.